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John Maynard Smith and Evolutionary Game Theory 
 
 
 
When John Maynard Smith passed away on April 19, 2004, most obituaries 
expressed the view that among the amazing wealth of his contributions to 
theoretical biology, the most significant was the introduction of game theoretical 
methods for the analysis of evolutionary problems. JMS would probably have 
agreed with this. In an essay entitled ‘Evolution and the Theory of Games’  
(Maynard Smith 1976), he set out to trace the history of this idea. With his 
characteristic blend of generosity and objectivity, he made it clear that he was 
not the first to discover the usefulness of game theory in evolutionary biology. 
Nevertheless, it is right to view him as the father of evolutionary game theory.  
 
A quip which is widespread in mathematical circles says that theorems are 
usually named, not after the first, but after the last person who discovered them.  
It highlights the fact that the history of science can be quite unjust in her 
attributions. But a discovery which remains widely unknown, or neglected, is of 
little use for the march of science. The last discoverer is often the one who 
moves the idea into public awareness, making it impossible for anyone, after 
that, to discover the idea anew. 
 
John Maynard Smith certainly made sure that no one, henceforth, could ignore 
the power of game theoretical thinking for all aspects of population biology. 
Furthermore, what Ernst Mayr called `the greatest conceptual revolution in 
biology´, namely, `the replacement of typological thinking by population 
thinking´ (Mayr 1970), was transferred by John Maynard Smith into game 
theory. 
 
The fact that John Maynard Smith was initially trained as an engineer had a 
significant impact on his biological work. In 1938, as an eighteen-year old 
graduate from Eton, he had visited his uncle, a British military attaché in Berlin, 
and witnessed a speech by Adolf Hitler. There was no need to know German to 
understand that war was imminent. Young Maynard Smith decided that the most 
useful thing to do was to become an aircraft engineer.  
 
In 1947, he left his engineering job to enrol as a student of biology at University 
College, London – aircraft were too noisy for his taste, and he vastly preferred 
birds – but the training in applied mathematics would prove of great help for his 
postgraduate work with J.B.S. Haldane. More importantly even, John Maynard 
Smith had learnt what it meant to work on design, and could appreciate the 
arguments from intelligent design, and all related issues of evolution, from the 
other side of the hill, as it were. Thus he could write on ´birds as aeroplanes´ 
(Maynard Smith, 1953), and many years later, he was to write (Maynard Smith 
1995): 
 
`Of course when thinking about the V2 rocket I was thinking about a product of 
human design, whereas a few years later, when I was thinking about the shapes 
of mammalian teeth, I was asking why mammals were better at chewing, and so 
left more descendants. But this difference had no effect on the way I thought 
about the two problems. Indeed, I have become increasingly convinced that 
there is no way of telling the difference between an evolved organism and an 
artefact designed by an intelligent being.´ 
 
Designers have routinely to face the task of optimising structure, or function. 
Optimisation arguments are widespread in physics, for instance in the principle 
of the least action, and have led to an elaborate mathematical theory, including 
variational calculus and dynamic programming. These tools are also used in 
economy, for instance to decide on an optimal bundle of goods. Some questions, 
including NP-hard problems like finding the shortest path joining sixty-four 
towns, can be extremely difficult to solve, but it is clear what is meant by a 
solution. This changes when economists have to consider the interaction of 
several decision-makers, all trying to maximise their income. Even the concept 
of a solution becomes problematic. The interdependence of the agents raises 
different questions needing new techniques. 
 
In 1944, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern introduced these 
techniques in their book `The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour’(von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) which met with a huge success in spite of 
being not exactly user-friendly. Originally, the authors had another title in mind: 
`Theory of Rational Behaviour’. It seems clear that this would have had less 
appeal with potential buyers. But more importantly, it would have nailed down 
the rationality axiom, and therefore obstructed applications of the theory in 
other, patently non-rational contexts. As it was, already in the 1949 thesis of 
John Nash, one finds a portend of the population dynamical approach which 
would be characteristic of evolutionary games, some twenty-five years later. 
Nash wrote: 
 
`We shall now take up he `mass action´ interpretation of equilibrium points…It 
is unnecessary to assume that the participants have full knowledge of the total 
structure of the game, or the ability or inclination to go through any complex 
reasoning process. But the participants are supposed to accumulate empirical 
information…Then the assumptions we made in this `mass action interpretation´ 
lead to the conclusion that the mixed strategies representing the average 
behaviour in each of the populations form an equilibrium point.´ 
 
Unfortunately, this part of the thesis was not published, in its time (but see  
Nash, 1996).  
 
Nevertheless, several scientists soon saw opportunities for applying game theory 
in evolution. The first to do so may have been R.A. Fisher (I own this remark to 
Olof Leimar, personal communication). In a little known paper (Fisher, 1958) 
Fisher wrote: 
 
`The relation between species, or among the whole assemblage of an ecology, 
may be immensely complex; and at Dr Cavalli’s invitation I propose to suggest 
that one way of making this intricate system intelligible to the human mind is by 
the analogy of games of skill, or to speak somewhat more pretentiously, of the 
Theory of Games´. 
 
Fisher goes on to relate that in 1934, he had shown that an ancient card game 
known as Le Her had a solution in terms of randomized strategies (Fisher 1934). 
Fisher then describes how, ten years later, von Neumann and Morgenstern had 
developed a general minimax principle, adding: `…to which, indeed, von 
Neumann had earlier drawn attention in one of the German mathematical 
journals.´ (In fact, von Neumann had proved the minimax theorem in 1928 
already, and Fisher had been unaware of it when he studied his card game.) 
 
What Fisher suggested was not evolutionary game theory, yet. The players he 
had in mind were species, not individuals. A similar suggestion was proposed, in 
1960, by Richard Lewontin, who discussed populations playing `against 
Nature´, with the survival of the species as payoff, and `hedging their bets´ 
against worst-case scenarios (Lewontin 1960). In both cases, the essential 
ingredient was still missing: the local competition within a population, and the 
fact that a strategy’s success depends on its frequency. The same applies to a 
paper by Verner (Verner, 1965) on sex ratios. 
 
The first to explicitly use game theory to model intra-species competition and 
frequency-dependent fitness values was William D. Hamilton, in his theory of 
extraordinary sex-ratios (Hamilton 1967). In fact, he considered both `a play of 
the individual against the population`, and pairwise competition (of two 
parasitoids within the same host). Maynard Smith had been familiar with that 
work since 1963, having been the external examiner in Hamilton´s PhD 
examination. He also understood that RA Fisher had used similar types of 
arguments in 1930 already, in order to explain the prevalence of 1:1 sex ratios, 
of course without couching his idea into the language of game theory (Fisher 
1930). A similar approach was taken up in 1965 by MacArthur (MacArthur 
1965). 
 
In 1970, a maverick scientist from the US, George Price, submitted to Nature a 
paper explaining how animals using a strategy of retaliation could have a 
selective advantage in intraspecific conflicts. This allowed to understand the 
prevalence of ritualised behaviour in animal contests without recurring to  
explanations in terms of group selection. Maynard Smith was quick to see the 
merits of this approach. He had always been a fervent `adaptationist´ using 
optimisation arguments to explain the outcomes of natural selection. But he was 
impatient with all those who used such arguments in a muddle-headed way and 
thereby offered easy targets to the opponents of adaptationism. In particular, 
John Maynard Smith militated against all those using what Haldane had called 
Pangloss´s Theorem  (cf Maynard Smith, 1985), and kept pointing out the 
possibility of  evolutionary traps, or Red Queen types of evolution. In particular, 
this was one of the reasons for his intense interest in sexual selection, and 
signalling theory. He had no patience with those (such as Huxley or Lorenz) 
who argued, for instance, that escalated contests would militate against the 
survival of the species.  
 
In spite of the merits of the manuscript by Price, John Maynard Smith could not 
recommend publication, as it was far too long for Nature. He suggested either to 
publish it somewhere else, or to re-submit a shorter version, and then went for 
three months to Chicago, where he developed a formal definition of 
evolutionarily stable strategies, and applied this to study the `Hawk-Dove-
Retaliator´ game and the `War of Attrition´. He wrote later (Maynard Smith 
1976): 
 
`When I came to write up this work, it was clearly necessary to quote Price. I 
was somewhat taken aback to discover that he had never published his idea and 
was now working on something else. When I returned to London I contacted 
him, and ultimately we published a joint paper in which the concept of an 
evolutionarily stable strategy was applied to animal contests.´ 
 
Three aspects of that joint paper (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973) proved 
seminal. One was the emergence of the mathematical concept of an ESS, leading 
ultimately to the marriage of game theory and population dynamics. The second 
was the use of agent-based computer simulations. The third, of course, was the 
application of game theory to conflicts between animals, and more generally to 
non-rational players. 
 
There is little to say here on the mathematical concept of an ESS, since the 
following article by a foremost expert will investigate this aspect in depth (see 
also Lessard, 1990). Suffice it to say, here, that an ESS is a behavioural program 
such that, if all individuals adopt it, no minority using another strategy can 
invade. In retrospect, this notion was found to be one of a great variety of related 
refinements of the concept of a Nash equilibrium, based on an underlying 
dynamics describing the potential invasion. In spite of owning a copy of Luce 
and Raiffa (1958), John Maynard Smith was not familiar with the vast literature 
on Nash equilibria and equilibrium selection which already existed. Peter 
Hammerstein, a PhD student which JMS shared with the eminent game theorist 
Reinhard Selten, put this to right, eventually. In the preface of his book on 
`Evolution and the Theory of Games’ (Maynard Smith 1982), Maynard Smith 
writes that he owes a special debt to `Peter Hammerstein, who has helped [me] 
to understand some theoretical questions more clearly’. Nevertheless, he 
unabashedly kept confusing the concept of an ESS with that (more general) of a 
Nash equilibrium, or with that (more special) of an unbeatable strategy, which 
had been defined, although implicitly, by William Hamilton. His interest in the 
diverse ramifications of the concept remained limited, except when it had to be 
adapted to new biological situations, for instance asymmetric games, finite 
populations, games among relatives, transmission by learning, or by Mendelian 
heredity. On each of these issues, he wrote short, basic papers setting the matter 
straight (Maynard Smith and Parker, 1976, Maynard Smith 1988, Hines and 
Maynard 1979, Maynard Smith 1981a, Maynard Smith 1981b) and left it to 
others to elaborate the issues. 
 
For John Maynard Smith, mathematics was a tool. He was (like his mentor JBS 
Haldane) a vigorous defender of what detractors called beanbag genetics, and 
never tired to stress that `mathematics is crucial for further progress in 
evolutionary biology´ (Maynard Smith 1982, reprinted 1988). His introductory 
textbooks played a pioneering role in teaching theoretical biologists not to be 
afraid of  mathematics, and additionally in captivating mathematicians by 
biological problems (as I can testify). As John Maynard Smith wrote,  
 
But mathematics was, in his hands, essentially a way of secure the results of his 
biological intuition: `If the mathematical analysis of some system predicts that it 
will behave in a particular way, one usually tries to gain some insight into why it 
should do so… If I cannot gain such an insight, I check the algebra, or the 
computer program, and expect to find a mistake.´ He added: `mathematics 
without natural history is sterile, but natural history without mathematics is 
muddled´ (Maynard Smith 1988). 
 
Within the habitat of a biological faculty, it is relatively easy to acquire a 
reputation as mathematician. John Maynard Smith never tried to do so (although 
he gleefully boasted with the elliptic integrals occurring in Maynard Smith and 
Hofbauer, 1987). But he was well aware that the ideas which he developed 
could offer points of departure for mathematical theory, and viewed himself 
without false modesty as a gold mine for mathematicians. 
 John Maynard Smith liked to say that in his next life, he would want to be a 
programmer. He greatly enjoyed testing and developing simple programs, not 
necessarily of a biological nature. In fact, his paper with Price (Maynard Smith 
and Price, 1973) is one of the most successful early examples of agent-based 
modelling. In the intervening thirty years, this technique has been established as 
a tool for methodological individualism for the social sciences, due to no small 
part to the progress in programming languages, for instance Java. Maynard 
Smith (who always stuck to Fortran) followed the development in this field with 
keen interest and his usual passion for debate. Some of the most visible work in 
the area was performed in the Santa Fé Institute, and he commented it with a 
mixture of enthusiasm and irritation. The irritation arose whenever he felt that 
the biological background was not suitably analysed – he had little inclination to 
analyse phase transitions in cellular automata per se, for instance, removed from 
scientific motivations. But he was highly appreciative of all attempts aiming to 
view evolution in its broadest sense, including chemical evolution, or the 
evolution of genetic algorithms in artificial cyber-worlds, and not to restrict 
attention to the one evolving system which we are familiar with (Maynard Smith 
1992).  
 
Many of the evolutionary questions arising in his joint book with Eörs 
Szathmary, the `Major Transitions of Evolution´ (Maynard Smith and 
Szathmary, 1995), were social questions, dealing with the issue of units of 
selection (genes, organelles, cells, organisms) ganging up to form higher units of 
selection (genomes, cells, organisms, societies). Maynard Smith was fascinated 
by these issues. In the debate between group selection versus individual 
selection, he had been one of the most vocal participants. He viewed both game 
theory and agent-based simulations as equally useful tools for methodological 
individualism. 
 
A few years after his Nature paper with Price, the applications of game theory to 
animal behaviour came in hard and fast, first in the form of studies of 
asymmetric conflicts (as between owner and intruder of a territory), and 
different  forms of `wars of attrition´ and ritualised display behaviour. Soon it 
was understood that the same issues were presents in conflicts between plants 
(concerning tree height, for instance, or root shape) and of micro-organisms. 
Other applications concerned sex ratio, parental investment, mating behaviour, 
dispersal rates, alarm calls, or life histories. By now, the number of papers 
applying game theory to animal behaviour is in the thousands (see Dugatkin, 
1997).  
 
Inevitably, this scientific success story influenced the application of game theory 
to human interactions. The current boom of experimental games and learning 
theories is greatly influenced by evolutionary game theory. In addition to 
economic interactions, the evolution of morals or of language was studied by 
means of game theoretical models (Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004,  Nowak et al, 
2001). This had a substantial impact on early forms of sociobiology and 
evolutionary psychology, but Maynard Smith kept his distance to these debates, 
possibly because they were so freighted with ideology. He deplored the 
`controversies…of that singularly useless type which take place when people do 
not understand each other`, and confessed: 
`I find myself disagreeing most strongly with whichever I side I talked to last…´ 
(Maynard Smith, 1995) 
 
He added: `For me, the applications of socio-biology to humans are peripheral´.  
This aloofness may seem strange in a person who was so eminently sociable, but 
it was completely natural to him. I well remember how gleefully he greeted the 
discovery that male lizards of the species Uta stansburia were engaged in a 
game with rock-paper-scissors structure (Maynard Smith 1998): `They have 
read my book!´  
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